Introduction
This chapter examines Fleet Street's coverage of the US-led Operation Moshtarak in Afghanistan in 2010. It outlines the major strands of US/UK military strategy since the 1980s (defined here as New Militarist) and argues that the conflict in Afghanistan, as currently represented in the mainstream media, is no war at all: rather it's a series of manufactured, media-hyped "operations" led by a nation with the largest and most heavily resourced fighting force in history, against a pitifully under-resourced and yet skilful and merciless guerrilla movement in one of the most impoverished countries in the world.
So the role of the media embedded with the military is to manufacture the image of legitimate, heroic "warfare" against a credible threat. In the process the reality of the conflict, the appalling suffering of the Afghan people, is kept secret from the British public. The chapter also considers Fleet Street's editorial stances on the Afghanistan war -which was costing the UK £5billion a year (see Norton-Taylor 2010a) 1 -and the ways in which the views of the public (most of whom consistently call for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan) have been marginalised. The study draws on a range of alternative media to critique mainstream coverage.
Secret warfare
There are three major strands to New Militarist strategy -each accompanied by a particular form of media coverage. Firstly the most important strategy is conducted in complete secrecy away from the glare of the media. This involves in the case of Afghanistan during 2010:
• the targeted assassinations in both Afghanistan and over the border in Pakistan of alleged Taliban leaders (Walsh 2010a );
• the night raids by the CIA and some of its 56,000 Special Forces, such as the • the secret detention and torture centres;
• the secret and massively expensive installation of almost 400 US and coalition military bases in Afghanistan and at least 300 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) bases. According to investigative reporter Nick Turse (2010) : "Existing in the shadows, rarely reported on and little talked about, this base-building programme is nonetheless staggering in size and scope…It has added significantly to the already long secret list of Pentagon property overseas and raises questions about just how long, after the planned beginning of a drawdown of American forces in 2011, the US will still be garrisoning Afghanistan."
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• the many disappearances;
• the increasing and largely secret use of pilotless drones to attack targets in Afghanistan and over the border in Pakistan; 4 In a celebratory feature on Britain's £124 million drones programme, Rob Waugh (2010) commented:
"Autonomous machines save money, save pilots' lives and point to a future where Stealth-enabled unmanned fighters and ultra-long-endurance surveillance planes can almost remove human beings from the aerial battlefield. But this technology has largely appeared without governments or the public questioning it."
• the penetration of allied and enemy governments by the CIA/MI6. In October 2009, for instance, it was revealed that the brother of Afghan president, Ahmed Wali Karzai, long alleged to be a powerful drug lord, had been on the CIA's payroll for almost eight years (Borger 2009 On 7 June 2010, the Independent reported that US special forces were operating in more than 75 countries -from Colombia to the Philippines. The "secret war" had vastly increased in scope and size under President Obama (Sengupta 2010a In the case of the US, the investment in secret warfare is still greater than that of the UK. Cecil Currey (1991: 72-73) For 17 years, Washington poured $4bn into the pockets of some of the most brutal men on earthy -with the overall aim of exhausting and ultimately destroying the Soviet Union in a futile war. One of them, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a warlord particularly favoured by the CIA, received tens of millions of dollars.
His speciality was trafficking opium and throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil. In 1994, he agreed to stop attacking Kabul on condition he was made prime minister -which he was.
Special forces, such as the UK's SAS and the American Navy Seals, which are so crucial to secret warfare strategies, reportedly played important roles in the build up to the 1991 Iraq conflict and during them. They were the subject of a series of "inordinately flattering" features in the US and UK media (Ray and Schaap 1991:. 11 ). Yet accounts of their daring deeds of courage and endurance, since they were shrouded in almost total secrecy, amount to a form of fiction (see de la Billière 1995: 319-338; Hunter 1995: 169-175; Kemp 1994: 191-197) .
By 2010, covert military action lay at the heart of US/Nato strategy in Afghanistan, Featherstone, too (1993; 1993a) has identified the way in which the • They were all quickie attacks. The Libya bombings lasted just 11 minutes. All the others were over within days.
• They were all largely risk free and fought from the air. Since reporters were banned from accompanying pilots on the fighter jets, then the crucial air war was conducted largely in secret.
• All the attacks resulted in appalling civilian casualties. Yet the propaganda, in
Orwellian style, claimed the raids were essentially for peaceful purposes.
Casualty figures were covered up and the military hardware was constantly
represented as "precise", "surgical", "modern" and "clean".
• Central to the new strategy was the demonisation of the enemy leaders. In the absence of any serious military force, this demonisation served to represent the enemy states as credible threats.
• Media pools were deployed largely to keep journalists away from any action.
• All the invasions were celebrated in ecstatic language throughout the mainstream media. The editorial consensus remained firmly behind the military attacks. Administration lies were rarely challenged just as the global protests against the actions were largely ignored.
Defeat in Vietnam had proved to be a terrible trauma to the American military and political elites. With the waning of Soviet power in the 1980s, American imperialism could operate largely unchallenged. Victories were gained -and yet they were gained against largely puny Third World countries. The "Vietnam syndrome" could only be kicked in a "big" war. And Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was to prove the perfect opportunity for the manufacture of this perfect "big" war. 
No basis in international law
The Afghanistan conflict launched in 2001 following the 9/11 outrages in the US clearly had little basis in international law. So, in these "operations", the essential role of the media embedded with the military and constrained by the enormous risks involved in reporting from such a lawless country, is to manufacture the image of legitimate, heroic so-called "warfare" against a credible threat. In other words, the conventional language of the military is deployed to describe completely asymmetrical conflict. As Bishop points out (op cit: 13):
Wars with insurgents were always unbalanced. One side had modern conventional weapons. The other fought with what was cheap, portable and easily improvised. But in Afghanistan the scale of the asymmetry at times seemed blackly absurd.
In the process the reality of the conflict, the high-tech violence of the invading forces, the appalling suffering of the Afghan people, is kept secret from the British public.
We know precisely how many Coalition troops are killed (all of them, indeed, tragic and unnecessary), their names, their family histories -and how many have been It's more a show of force by the coalition forces, something they can offer their home audiences of how they've gone into a village and retaken some Taliban.
But beyond that, nothing will really change on the ground, regardless of what happens in Marjah. It's just business as usual.
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Investigative reporter Gareth Porter (2010b: 8) claimed that the picture of Marjah presented by military officials and obediently reported by major news media was "one of the clearest and most dramatic pieces of misinformation of the entire war, apparently aimed at hyping the offensive as a historic turning point in the conflict".
On 2 February 2010, Associated Press quoted "Marine commanders" saying they expected 400 to 1,000 insurgents to be "holed up" in the southern Afghan town of 80,000 people". According to Porter, "that language evoked an image of house-tohouse urban street fighting". On 14 February, the second day of the "offensive", Lt
Josh Diddams said the Marines were "in the majority of the city at this point". He also used the language that conjured images of urban fighting, claiming the insurgents were hold some "neighbourhoods". Yet, as Porter stressed, Marjah is not a city nor even a real town but either a few clusters of farmers' homes or a large agricultural area covering much of the southern Helmand River Valley.
Maintaining the myth of warfare
Predictably the Coalition forces were reported as "storming" Marjah. More superlatives appeared in the press to manufacture the image of credible warfare: the town was suspected of being "one of the biggest, most dangerous minefields Nato forces had ever faced" (Martin 2010). Brig Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marines in southern Afghanistan, was quoted as saying: "This may be the largest IED threat and largest minefield that Nato has ever faced." while the US military were reported as saying that "hundreds of beleaguered insurgents could insist to fight until death" (ibid).
On 13 February Gulab Mangal, governor of Helmand, was reported as saying it was "the most successful operation we have ever carried out". Duncan Larcombe (2010) British troops arrived, the province had been "relatively quiet", according to Andrew
Krepinevich, who served on the personal staff of three US secretaries of defence, but their arrival "stirred up a hornet's nest" (Evans 2010 ).
The contradictions of New Militarism and the failure of Operation Moshtarak
Central to manufacture of New Militarist "operations" is the celebration of "victory" Moreover, a survey of 1,994 people in Afghanistan, commissioned by Gen.
McChrystal found that 85 per cent viewed the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers".
More than two thirds said they viewed Karzai's government as totally corrupt while the occupying forces and Afghan police were considered the greatest threat to personal security by 56 per cent (Cogan op cit).
Missing from the coverage: the massive, global opposition
Largely missing from the Moshtarak coverage is any acknowledgement of the views and protests of the massive anti-war movement in this country and globally. CND, the Scott (2008) , Kemp, Hughes (2009 ) and Junger (2010 ). Geoff Dyer (2010 argues that writing in this non-fiction genre is best able to capture the essence of US-style warfare today: "Reportage, long-form reporting -call it what you will -has left the novel looking superfluous. The fiction lobby might respond: it's too soon to tell." He adds: "We are moving beyond the nonfiction novel to different kinds of narrative art, different forms of cognition. Loaded with moral and political point, narrative has been recalibrated to record, honour and protest the latest, historically specific instance of futility and mess." 8 Significantly, the Mail Foreign Service reported on 15 June 2010 that untapped ore -including huge veins of gold, iron, copper, cobalt and industrial metals such as lithium -valued at more than £820
